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Introduction 
One of the first announcements made by the majority Conservative government on coming 
to power in the UK in May 2015 was in relation to proposed legislation on trade unions. The 
newly appointed Business Secretary Sajid Javid stated on the BBC Today Programme that 
‘We've already made clear, in terms of strike laws, that there will be some significant 
changes... it will be a priority of ours. We need to update our strike laws. We've never 
hidden away the changes we want to make. I think it's essential to make these changes’ 
(BBC News 2015). At first sight, this might suggest that the return to a Conservative majority 
government signalled a significant change in the way relationships were to be structured 
with trade unions, reflective of the significant legislative attacks on trade unions under the 
Thatcher and Major Conservative administrations of the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
In this chapter, however, it is argued, that the origins of the proposed Trade Union Bill - with 
its aims of not simply introducing thresholds for industrial action ballots, but also of 
regulating the collection of membership subscriptions and time-off given to trade union 
representatives in the public sector, of restricting picket line and social media activity, and 
regulating the funding of political activities by unions - also reflects a number of significant 
developments in employment relations and the relationship between the British state and 
trade unions during the period of Coalition government between 2010 and 2015.  
 
In this sense the Bill represents a useful lens through which to look back at the relationship 
between the Coalition government and trade unions. However, the danger of solely using 
the Bill to seek to understand this period of is that it can lead to an analysis that is both 
fragmented and narrow in scope. This chapter will, therefore, try to analyse the relationship 
between the Coalition government and trade unions from a wider context, namely the role 
ascribed to trade unions by successive UK governments. It starts by looking briefly at the 
relationship between the New Labour administrations and the trade unions, highlighting 
how attempts at substantive trade union renewal were constrained by government support 
for neo-liberal policy prescriptions; a limited and individually focused legislative programme; 
and by deliberate attempts by New Labour to re-focus trade union purpose. It is argued this 
left the union movement in a weak position when the Coalition government was formed to 
resist the attacks largely conducted under post-financial crisis austerity politics. However, 
there was a growing polarisation within the union movement between those unions seeking 
to make substantive gains from the partnership and union learning opportunities offered by 
New Labour and those which sought to rebuild a more traditional relationship with New 
Labour and a more adversarial one with employers.  
 
This provides a framework for analysing the relationship between the Coalition government 
and the unions. While aspects of the Coalition’s labour market and employment law reforms 
and the impact of austerity on public sector employment relations are covered in chapters 
five and ten respectively, this chapter will focus specifically upon three areas where the 
Coalition government sought to address the most forceful challenges from the unions. 
2 
 
 
 
Firstly, the chapter will examine the Coalition’s response to the direct challenge of the 
Public and Commercial Services (PCS) union, which developed active campaigns and 
industrial action strategies in proposing an alternative to austerity. Secondly, it explores the 
government’s response to the threat posed by the deployment of an effective ‘leverage’ 
strategy by Unite-the-union (Unite) across a number of key sectors. Finally, it highlights the 
role of the government in seeking to pressurise the leadership of the Labour Party to 
marginalise trade union ‘influence’ within the party in the wake of an internal party 
investigation into the operation of Unite’s political strategy in Falkirk. 
 
The central argument to emerge from this analysis is that, from a broad policy perspective, 
the Coalition government’s approach to trade unions was consistent with previous post-
1979 administrations, seeing them primarily as a potential economic and political challenge 
to the policy goals of modernisation, privatisation and austerity, and thus seeking to attack 
the unions’ attempts to foster, and mobilise, opposition to these neo-liberal goals. In this 
respect the Coalition government’s relationship with the union movement reflected the 
state’s imperative of marginalising opposition to neo-liberalism, and played an important 
role in the continuation of, and current extension of state policy toward trade unions, as 
reflected in the Conservative government’s 2015 Trade Union Bill.  
 
1997 and all that 
By the time of the 2010 General Election the trade union movement was at a low ebb, both 
despite, and because of the legacy of the 1997-2010 Labour Government. Governmental 
action undertaken by New Labour provided no substantive means for unions to re-establish 
their influence and, through ‘modernisation’ strategies, also pressurised the unions’ new 
heartland of the public sector. By 2010, both union membership and density had declined, 
albeit at a much slower rate than between 1979 to 1997. Total union membership stood at 
6.5 million, representing a density of 26.6 per cent. Trade union density stood at 56.3 per 
cent in the public sector (down from 61.3% in 1997) and 14.2 per cent in the private sector 
(down from 20.2%). Collective bargaining coverage had also contracted to 30.8 per cent of 
all employees 16.8 per cent in the private sector (down from 22.0 per cent in 1997) and 64.5 
in the public sector (down from 74.9 per cent in 1997) (Achur 2010). The union movement 
had not recovered membership or significant workplace or political influence after thirteen 
years of New Labour governments. While the framework provided by the government 
provided scope for unions to pursue revitalisation policies, the weakness of employment 
law passed and the refusal to countenance any meaningful changes to legislation on 
industrial action, left the unions treading water. 
 
How had this situation come to pass? Certainly, the origins lay in the Conservative 
governments of 1979-1997. The Conservative governments used state power, as economic 
manager, legislator and employer (Hyman 2009) to undermine trade unions by altering the 
structure of the economy and employment and changing the way the employment 
relationship was regulated to exclude organised labour, notably through a series of anti-
union laws circumscribing industrial action, union governance and internal affairs. By 1997 
union membership and density and collective bargaining coverage were all approaching half 
their 1980 figures. The fulcrum of the union movement switched from the private to the 
public sector. 
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The New Labour election victory, however, saw some legislation, much of it derived from 
European Union directives, favourable to a ‘floor’ of workers’ rights and to trade union 
representation. Prominent among the latter category were a process by which unions could 
pursue legal recognition for collective bargaining purposes with employers (Employment 
Relations Act, 1999); the introduction of the right to paid time off for union learning 
representatives (ULRs) (Employment Act, 2002); and use of state funds to permit trade 
unions to modernise (Employment Relations Act, 2004). From about 2005 onwards, 
however, unions increasingly identified problems with Labour’s legislative programme, from 
the problems of using the recognition law to the weak implementation of both the Working 
Time and Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, which failed to provide 
the scope for rebuilding collective organisation at work. 
 
At the same time, trade unions sought to develop more effective strategies for addressing 
membership decline and loss of influence. It is argued that unions moved away from what 
had been termed a ‘servicing model’ of trade unionism characterised by a ‘passive and 
disengaged membership relying upon a bureaucratic union officialdom to remedy workplace 
problems as they arise’ (Cooper 2001, 435) and which focused upon recruiting members 
through providing individual services and benefits rather than collective action (Hyman 
1996, 72-73).  
 
Three strands were evident: organising, partnership, and educational provision. The most 
prominent strategy was that of organising. This emphasised the importance of member 
participation and workplace organisation, building membership through highlighting 
workplace grievances and expanding the unions into new sectors and workplaces, whilst 
targeting under-represented groups of workers (Heery et al. 2000). Optimism spread as 
approximately 3000 new recognition deals had been secured achieved by 2005 (Nowak 
2009, 133). While organising placed an emphasis upon challenging employers, the TUC also 
developed a parallel, neo-unitary partnership approach. The partnership strategy also has to 
be viewed in the context of the relationship between unions and New Labour. In this sense 
partnership was promoted by New Labour as part of the ‘third way’ it proposed, where 
relations between state, trade unions and business were redefined, and offered the union 
movement, through the TUC, limited influence at the national policy level as well as stability 
in the workplace. The final major area of trade union activity since 1997 was in the area of 
educational provision. Workplace learning was increasingly advocated by British trade 
unions, promoting the Labour governments’ strategy of ‘lifelong learning’. The TUC Learning 
Services department (later renamed Union Learn), and the introduction of Union Learning 
Representatives (ULRs), following the establishment of the Union Learning Fund, was a 
major initiative of the Labour government. ULRs received (limited) statutory rights, including 
paid time-off for union learning activities, in workplaces where unions were recognised. This 
provided some £81 million of state funds for union learning activities by 2006 (Clough 2007).  
 
Some argue that New Labour through its minimalist legislative programme, support for 
partnership and state funding of unions for learning activities was essentially trying to re-
conceptualise the role of trade unionism (Smith and Morton 2009). For example, McIlroy 
(2009) argues that New Labour’s notion of trade unionism was rooted in partnership and 
HRM techniques, with the emphasis on non-conflictual partnership between employees 
(rather than unions) and employers. He highlights union learning as a means to refocus 
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trade union activities away from organising workers and pursuing joint regulation, to 
incorporating unions as an extended arm of the state, delivering skills training, to 
compensate for the lack of employer-led training (McIlroy 2008). This role perceives unions 
as organisations helping to deliver productivity and growth, with a limited role in regulating 
the employment relationship, implementing (rather than formulating) state policy, 
excluding a more oppositional role promoting redistribution and challenging, through 
collective bargaining and industrial action, managerial decision making. 
 
The clearest examples of how these rival conceptions of trade unionism impacted upon the 
relationship between New Labour and the union movement were to be found in the public 
sector, particularly over the contested concept of ‘modernisation’. Restructuring, 
privatisation and private-public partnerships emphasised the continuity between the New 
Labour administrations and their Conservative predecessors. Attempts to pursue this 
modernisation strategy, particularly through restructuring terms and conditions of 
employment, resulted in industrial action throughout many parts of the public sector, with 
almost three fifths of all working days lost due to strikes occurring in the public sector 
between 1997 and 2006, and with increasing days lost in the period 2002 to 2006 (Lyddon 
2009, 320). Senior Labour ministers’ actions highlight the extent to which New Labour was 
prepared to address the challenge of adversarial trade unionism. The most serious dispute 
involved the firefighters between 2002-2003, where the Fire Brigade Union’s (FBU) 
demands for a significant wage rise opened up negotiations over working practices and 
where Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott intervened to scupper an initial agreement 
(Seifert and Sibley 2005). When the Prison Officers’ Association (POA) also called a one-day 
national strike in 2007, over the staging of a Pay Review Body award, the Home Secretary 
Jack Straw announced legislation to restore the ban on strikes by prison officers (Lyddon 
2009, 323). 
 
Overall, the New Labour era left the weakened union movement divided over strategies. 
While some unions became embedded in partnership and union learning and used 
organising simply as a recruitment tool, others tried to focus upon a more adversarial form 
of organising, with some unions withdrawing from the TUC Organising Academy, due to 
conflicting opinions and ‘unrealized expectations’ as to the aims of organising (Simms and 
Holgate 2010). Nevertheless, the cost of organising led many unions to adopt it as a 
mechanism to ‘fill-in’ membership gaps in recognised work places rather than to secure new 
recognition agreements. At a political level this polarisation was also represented by the 
election of a growing number of union leaders advocating a more adversarial approach to 
industrial relations and demanding a more critical political stance. Dubbed the ‘awkward 
squad’ by sections of the media, this group of general secretaries, representing unions such 
as National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT), Communication Workers 
Union (CWU), Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS), Fire Brigades Union (FBU) and 
the predecessor unions that formed Unite, were often ambivalent about their unions’ 
relationship with New Labour. 
 
The Coalition, the politics of austerity and trade union responses 
The Coalition government, formed following the May 2010 general election as a result of 
successful negotiations between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat political parties, 
was founded upon a shared understanding of the need to improve the public finances, 
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following the financial crisis, and to do this primarily through policies of austerity. However, 
associated with austerity policies was a fundamental attempt to radically restructure the 
welfare state. While the case for reducing public debt was highlighted as the main reason 
for the austerity agenda, underpinning this was the re-assertion of neo-liberalism, 
contrasting Coalition policy with what had been perceived to be the more centralised 
economic management exercised on the part of the Brown Labour government to the 
unfolding financial crisis from mid-2007 (Painter 2012, 4).  
 
This re-focusing of neo-liberal policy was pursued with rigour in relation to labour market 
deregulation. The impact of the resultant detrimental changes to individual employment 
rights; the access to, and cost of, employment tribunals; to health and safety legislation 
coverage; as well as privatisation of public services and the impact of public expenditure 
cuts on jobs, terms and conditions and notably pensions are covered elsewhere in this book. 
However, the substantive focus here is the measures taken by the Coalition government in 
relation to some of the most significant challenges by the trade unions to its labour market 
policies. We discuss, in turn, the Coalition’s responses to trade union militancy in the civil 
service in particular, to the adoption of new forms of union protest and campaigning, and to 
the relationship between organised workers and the main opposition party, the Labour 
Party. 
 
The PCS: alternative visions and the new model employer. 
The PCS is the largest civil service union, created in 1998 following a series of mergers 
among unions covering  staff up to those in middle management grades.. Many of these 
predecessor unions had traditionally been led by officials who sought to establish 
partnership arrangements to ameliorate the worst impact of government reform across the 
civil service. This was the position of the leadership following the merger to create the PCS, 
which had signed a partnership agreement in 2000. However, the election of Mark Serwotka 
as general secretary and the success of left-wing factions in securing control over the 
national executive committee saw the union shift markedly to the left, leading to a more 
combative strategy with ‘an increased emphasis on a militant bargaining 
agenda…“ambitious” bargaining goals; and a willingness to use collective mobilisations, such 
as strikes, to achieve the union’s bargaining aims’ (McCarthy 2010, 186-187). This was 
backed up by a strong commitment to the organising agenda, focused upon building 
membership, workplace representatives and mobilising for industrial action. The PCS 
subsequently saw an impressive growth in membership. It rose from 295,063 in 2003 to 
311,998 by the end of 2006. However, membership did fall following the financial crisis as a 
result of the public sector cuts pursued by New Labour, to 301,562 by the end of 2009 
(Certification Officer 2003; 2006; 2009).  
 
In response to the austerity agenda of the Coalition government, in 2010 the PCS published 
a pamphlet entitled ‘There is an alternative: The case against cuts in public spending’ (PCS 
2010). This directly challenged coalition policies, arguing for policies aimed at stimulating 
economic growth through public investment in housing, renewable energy and transport 
(using the publically owned, bailed out, banks to facilitate that investment); opposing plans 
to privatise public services which would lead to worse terms and conditions for staff 
(reducing potential tax revenue), poorer services and loss revenues; and highlighting the 
need to focus upon tax collection, with estimates of the total annual tax gap (avoidance, 
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evasion and non-collection) at over £120 billion, rather than focusing on benefit fraud (PCS 
2010). This alternative set of policy proposals formed a central plank of PCS political 
campaigning and was followed by further campaigns, with the publication in 2012 of a 
follow up pamphlet Austerity isn't working: There is an alternative (PCS 2012). In this 
pamphlet, the PCS took the Coalition Government to task over its austerity record, 
highlighting the comparatively poor performance of the UK economy, the significant 
increases in unemployment and increased borrowing and the failure to bring down public 
debt. The central focus of the critique was the spiralling inequality, with real wage falls for 
most workers, but significant increases in wealth at the top of society (PCS 2012).  
 
These political challenges to the government were developed further when specific sections 
of the civil service and related sectors were subject to the threat of privatisation. One of the 
key planks used in campaigns to defend the Land Registry from privatisation and against 
cuts in the culture sector were the alternative vision documents authored by academics 
Seifert and Ironside (2013; 2014). In the case of the Land Registry, for example, the 
alternative vision underpinned PCS campaigning and strike action in 2014, which led the 
government to shelve plans for privatisation.  
 
It can be argued that the civil service became the key employment relations battleground 
during the Coalition government. While the PCS developed their wider anti-austerity 
campaigns, austerity policies immediately focused upon the civil service. As Hodder (2015, 
938-939) notes, three problems coalesced: a recruitment freeze across the civil service for 
2010-2011, public sector pay caps, and detrimental changes introduced through the 
Superannuation Act (2010), leading to reduced Civil Service Compensation Scheme (CSCS) 
entitlements for compulsory and voluntary redundancies. The PCS used a combination of 
(unsuccessful) legal challenges and industrial action throughout 2011 on pay, pensions and 
the CSCS changes. Despite mobilising against the proposed changes the PCS were ultimately 
unable to resist the cuts imposed through scheme changes, secure substantive pay 
increases above the government pay cap or halt job reductions, with 66,900 jobs lost from 
the civil service between 2008 and 2013 (ONS 2013).  
 
The Coalition government’s success in implementing their austerity policies led them to 
pursue further cuts in terms in conditions. In December 2012, HR Directors in government 
departments received a letter from the Cabinet Office asking them to review terms and 
conditions, including working hours, leave entitlements, flexi-time arrangements, childcare, 
special leave and parental leave arrangements, career breaks and sick leave and pay 
entitlements (Hague 2012). Despite overwhelming opposition to these proposals (French 
2014), research and consultation within the PCS indicated that members were not prepared 
to mobilise nationally to oppose the proposals.  
 
At the same time, the Coalition government began focusing its attention directly on the PCS 
with two further ‘reforms’, the facilities time granted to lay union representatives and 
check-off arrangements for paying union subscriptions through employers’ payroll. In July 
2012, the government launched a consultation into the level of facilities time. Again this was 
linked to austerity policies, with both the Taxpayers Alliance pressure group and the right-
wing Conservative Party Trade Union Reform Campaign highlighting the costs in public 
expenditure of funding arrangements for public sector trade union activity. As a result of the 
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consultation, the Cabinet Office oversaw moves to: limit the time spent on union work, so 
that trade union representatives would be required to spend at least 50 per cent of their 
time at work on their civil service job; place a cap upon the costs of all facility time of 0.1 per 
cent of each department’s paybill in the first year; and introduce rigorous systems to 
monitor and record how much time is spent on union work (Cabinet Office 2012).  
 
The next attack on the unions in the civil service related to the decision to end the check-off. 
In December 2013, the Cabinet Office minister Frances Maude circulated a letter suggesting 
that government departments should seek to charge unions for the check-off facility, which 
the PCS offered to pay (estimated to be about £350 per annum). Maude subsequently 
stated that it was not desirable for civil service employers to provide an unnecessary service 
for unions and, despite a successful legal challenge by the PCS in the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (costing the taxpayer £90,000), seven departments 
subsequently moved to end check-off, with the largest departments, the Department for 
Work and Pensions and HM Revenue and Customs, implementing it ahead of the 2015 
election (CLASS 2015, 1).  
 
The impact of all these attacks was significant. As a result, primarily, of job losses, PCS 
membership had fallen to 231,359 by the end of 2014 (Certification Officer 2014), and it was 
estimated that around 153,000 members needed to be signed up to direct debit - 100,000 
of whom had been signed up by February 2015 (PCS 2015a). With the decision not to pursue 
a possible merger with Unite, the PCS had to undergo internal restructuring to address 
failing membership income, while seeking to maintain a strong organising agenda. At the 
same time, union representatives tried to ensure that members received support and 
representation on significantly reduced facilities time. This not just affected the PCS, but 
also other unions operating in the civil service. Research by Hanks (2015) into Unite 
representatives in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has highlighted the impact of its 
‘Employment Relations Review’ on workplace organisation and member representation, 
with fewer full-time representatives able to cover a geographically dispersed sector, and 
requiring additional support from already stretched national and regional union officials, all 
at a time when further privatisation initiatives were being pursued. 
 
By imposing austerity policies on the civil service, the Coalition government actively revised 
the concept of the state as ‘model employer’, seeking to send a clear signal to business and 
society that public sector employment and terms and conditions should be kept tightly 
under control. Further, in attacking the PCS, notably in relation to check-off and facilities 
time, the coalition indicated how relationships with trade unions should be recast in the 
public sector, demonstrating that challenges from a militant union would not stop austerity 
policies and further reforms. It is not surprising, therefore, that both the limiting of facilities 
time and,  belatedly, the ending of check-off made their way into the later 2015 Trade Union 
Bill in relation to the public sector as a whole. The Coalition government and its 
Conservative successor have, therefore, focused their attention on the key areas of union 
organisation in the public sector, and taken on its most militant union, with the aim of 
diminishing union strength and influence in order to maintain a neo-liberal policy agenda. 
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Between leverage and protest: Ineos and the Carr Review 
After the retirements of Tony Woodley and Derek Simpson from the positions of joint 
general secretaries of Unite, in November 2010 Len McCluskey was elected as sole general 
secretary. Notwithstanding the size of the union and the different sectors represented 
within it, Unite has been a strong advocate of the organising model, but has also developed 
a strong community section to try to integrate unorganised and unemployed workers into 
the union movement and link grassroots political campaigning with industrial issues 
(Goulding 2012). The outcome of these developments was a union clearly on the left of the 
union movement, seeking to develop strong workplace influence. Although these 
developments pre-date the changes to the union’s rulebook, the 2015 rules revision 
conference provided an indication of this through the following key aims of the union (Unite 
2015, 1), namely to: 
 
organise, recruit and represent workers, and strengthen workplace organisation to 
achieve real union power for its members; help our members win in the workplace, 
using the union’s resources to assist in that process, and to support our members in 
struggle including through strike action; and have a strong political voice, fighting 
on behalf of working peoples’ interests, and to influence the political agenda locally, 
regionally, nationally and internationally, so as to promote a socialist vision. 
 
One of the new strategies develop by Unite under McCluskey’s leadership was the creation 
of a specific team to develop leverage strategies. Leverage is defined as a strategic 
campaign, unique to each employer, involving an analysis of what will change the position of 
the employer; an escalating targeting of all areas of weakness, both indirect and direct, to 
tactically and deliberately exert pressure and uncertainty, thereby creating maximum 
instability within the apparatus of the employer (Unite 2012). In this respect it reflects a 
new union strategy to address the weaknesses of trade unions under global neo-liberalism. 
As the Unite Leverage Strategy document (Unite 2012, 2) notes: 
 
Increased marketization and globalisation has changed the face of employers; 
multinational companies have grown in power and reach, whilst local and public 
employers have diversified and increasingly undertaken market led reforms. 
Modern capitalism is lazily viewed as bordering on the impenetrable for organised 
labour-but in addition to increased threat, change has also created new 
opportunities to win. 
 
It is crucial to understand, in this context, that leverage is a highly resource intensive 
strategy, where the union undertakes a highly focused analysis of the subject employer, 
including shareholders, suppliers, employers with whom that specific employer works; and 
communities within which the employer operates and customers. The success of leverage 
requires in depth research and planning and the ability once a campaign is running, to be 
able to escalate and build pressure. As such the extent of leverage campaigning is limited to 
key disputes where it is no longer possible through conventional industrial strategies to shift 
the employer. As a result, prior to the 2015 general election, only seven leverage campaigns 
had been run, all of which were won: Honda in 2011; MayrMeinhoff Packaging, Liverpool 
Mutual Homes, BESNA and the London Buses Olympic bonus in 2012; Howdens and 
Crossrail in 2013. 
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However, while leverage, as defined by Unite, is a centralised resource intensive strategy, to 
be used in a limited capacity, this does not stop the union’s industrial and community 
branches developing their own local forms of ‘leverage type’ activities when pursuing 
disputes using traditional forms of industrial action or developing campaigns. These could 
include protest meetings, leafleting, social media campaigns and working with other 
grassroots activists such as UK Uncut, 38 Degrees and living wage campaigns. Examples of 
wider campaigns would include the activities to highlight the use of zero hour contracts by 
Sportsdirect (Butler 2015) and the tipping policies of major high street restaurants such as 
Pizza Express (Gayle 2015), as well as the use of inflatable ‘protest rats’ in a number high 
profile industrial disputes such as the strike at St Mungo’s Housing Association (Unite 
2014a).  
 
These tactics should not be conflated with the central leverage campaigns, though this is 
exactly what occurred during the Ineos dispute in Grangemouth. Triggered by the 
suspension of the senior convenor, Stevie Deans, at Ineos in July 2013, Unite sought to 
ballot members on industrial action based on the alleged victimisation of the convenor and 
Ineos’ use of agency workers. In one of Unite’s best organised workplaces turnout was 86 
per cent, and 90.6 per cent of those workers voted in support of industrial action short of a 
strike. The issue then shifted to management raising concerns about the continued viability 
of the refinery, with the dispute escalating and management threatening to close the plant, 
unless 800 workers accepted a new contract based upon detrimental terms and conditions 
and pension provision (Carr 2014, 26-28). With ACAS talks failing, the threat to shut the 
plant was announced in October 2013, but was swiftly reversed following a government 
guaranteed £230 million loan to build a gas terminal, which will enable Ineos to store and 
process ethane from cheap US shale gas (Sharman and O’Connor 2014) and acceptance of 
the new contracts by Unite members (Seymour 2013).  
During this dispute Unite organised a series of protests, claimed to be targeted at the 
business properties and activities of the Ineos Chairman Jim Ratcliffe, in public locations, at 
financial institutions linked to Ineos and Ratcliffe, at Ineos suppliers as well as the personal 
properties of Ratcliffe. These were identified in the press as examples of bullying and 
intimidation deployed by the union against target employers, with an unnamed 
Grangemouth manager reporting that it ‘was a mob, a threatening mob. They were trying to 
humiliate me. Trying to portray me as a nasty boss, a nasty capitalist. To portray me as 
someone evil’ (Dixon 2013). The events at Grangemouth led to the Coalition government 
commissioning a public enquiry, the Carr Review, into the ‘use of extreme tactics in 
industrial disputes, including so-called leverage tactics; and the effectiveness of the existing 
legal framework to prevent inappropriate or intimidatory actions in trade disputes’ (Carr 
2014, 16). 
 
It is important to note how quickly the Coalition government moved to a full review and 
how it subsequently expanded the review to cover a range of sectors where managers 
claimed that bullying and intimidation, usually during industrial disputes, was practiced by 
union members and officials. It was notable that London Underground and the Fire and 
Rescue service were both identified, sectors where the respective unions, the RMT and FBU, 
have attempted to resist restructuring and austerity measures. This approach fitted nicely 
with Ineos’ own definition of leverage as: 
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Action [that] takes different forms but the common theme is an attempt to publicly 
intimidate or humiliate the individual or entity in question in order to pressurise the 
employer to make concessions in the industrial dispute which it would not otherwise 
make due to the personal or economic consequences of such action (Carr Review 2014, 
11). 
 
In the end the scope of the Review, which reported in October 2014, was modified at the 
request of the investigator, as the deliberations were becoming conflated with political 
campaigning ahead of the 2015 election, notably around the issue of ballot thresholds 
applying to London Underground disputes, and because TUC-affiliated unions and ACAS 
declined to participate in the review process (Eurwork 2014). Nevertheless, Carr reported 
that the Unite protests and activities at Grangemouth were not part of a substantive 
leverage campaign and that the evidence, including that submitted by the Hampshire 
Constabulary, did not indicate the Unite protests were anything but peaceful. Indeed, Carr 
(2014, 97-98) specifically noted in his review the need for state and police to protect 
freedoms of assembly and expression, even if the ideas being promoted might shock or 
offend others, constrained only by compelling evidence of the likelihood of serious violence 
or disorder.  
 
While the Carr Review explicitly did not make recommendations, following the re-scoping of 
the review by its author, and he highlights that there should be scope for unions 
undertaking public protest, the Ineos dispute, and the claimed use of leverage, is significant 
because of the subsequent Conservative government’s inclusion of sections on public order 
and – initially – social media use in the 2015 Trade Union Bill. Sections in the proposed 
legislation on picketing highlight further governmental concern with unions taking industrial 
action and seeking to mobilise protest in support of that action. This is consistent with a 
wider agenda to use executive and legislative action to limit protest affecting the 
implementation of neo-liberal policies that was visible under the Coalition government 
(Hallsworth and Lea 2011; Garland 2012; inter alia). Concerns included the police use of 
kettling, the handling of anti-fracking and tuition fee protests, as well as the scope given to 
how local authorities interpret and order bans against protest in the Anti-social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act (2014). 
 
Unite’s Political Strategy – all roads lead to Grangemouth! 
As highlighted in the previous section, upon winning the general secretary election and 
control of the National Executive Council, the United Left within Unite concentrated on 
political as well as industrial strategies, focusing upon their relationship to the Labour Party. 
Indeed, Len McCluskey claimed in the general secretary election campaign that he was 
constantly being asked by Unite members why the union donated so much money to the 
Labour Party (Hasan 2011). Against this backdrop a Political Strategy was developed in 2011 
and formally approved at the union’s 2012 Policy Conference, with the explicit aim of 
‘reclaiming’ the Labour Party. The central aims of the political strategy were outlined in four 
key areas: winning Labour for working people which aims to elect MPs, councillors and 
MSPs who share Unite’s trade union and socialist values; winning working people for Labour 
by recruiting Unite activists to the Labour Party and encouraging them to become active at 
all levels; building a broad alliance to defeat the Conservatives and their policies, including 
11 
 
 
 
the work of community branches; and winning a Labour government which will govern in 
the interests of working people and move towards a socialism for the 21st Century (Unite 
2011). 
 
The main focus of the strategy document related to Unite’s influence within the Labour 
Party by increasing activists’ involvement and participation in Constituency Labour Parties 
(CLPs) in order to secure the adoption of candidates sympathetic to trade unions and 
advance the union’s policy agenda through the party’s structures. In terms of outcomes, by 
the end of 2014, 40 Unite-supported candidates had been selected by CLPs to fight the 2015 
election (Ross 2013).   
 
However, the events that developed when Falkirk MP Eric Joyce resigned from the Labour 
Party in February 2012, after a fight in a House of Commons bar, were to lead to attacks on 
the union’s strategy from both within and outside of the Labour Party. Unite put its strategy 
into place in preparation for the 2015 general election, when Joyce would stand down. 
Stevie Deans (Unite convenor at Ineos) was elected chairman of the Falkirk West CLP, which 
covered about 70 per cent of the Falkirk parliamentary constituency. It was subsequently 
alleged that he recruited Unite members into Falkirk West CLP and paid their membership 
fees, which, at the time, was in line not only with Unite policy but also with Labour Party 
rules. This enabled them to vote in the selection process for parliamentary candidates, with 
Karie Murphy, the former Chair of the Scottish Labour Party, and a close friend of 
McCluskey, announcing her intention to be Labour’s candidate in Falkirk (Lodge and Thoms 
2015). 
 
Allegations then arose that Unite members had been recruited without their knowledge, or 
pressured into signing direct debit forms (Peterkin 2014), resulting in the suspension of the 
selection process and of Karie Murphy and Stevie Deans, an internal Labour Party inquiry 
and an eventual police investigation. The ensuing police report and Labour’s unpublished 
enquiry found no evidence of wrongdoing, and the suspensions of Murphy and Deans were 
lifted (Wintour 2013). However, as Jones (2015) argues, the actual facts had very little to do 
with the backlash against Unite by the Conservative Party and the mass media, who, 
spotting Labour’s weakness, demanded that the party leader, Ed Miliband, take action 
(Telegraph View 2013); especially in the light of the subsequent events at Grangemouth, 
examined above, where Ineos suspended Deans for actions relating to the Falkirk selection 
(Jones 2015).   
 
In direct response to these events, Miliband established the Collins Review into Labour Party 
Reform in July 2013 to examine and make recommendations for reform, including 
developing a new relationship between the party and its affiliated trade unions. After a six-
month consultation period, Collins reported in February 2014 recommending a range of 
new constitutional measures. Crucially, affiliation of trade union members to the party was 
to be changed, to ensure such members would actively consent to this process, rather than 
being affiliated by their union. This new group of ‘affiliated supporters’ would in turn gain 
certain rights such as voting in the one-member, one-vote leadership elections, though not 
for constituency candidates (Collins 2014). In a special Executive Council meeting in 
February 2014, the Collins Reforms were supported (Unite 2014b), and were backed by 86 
per cent of a special party conference in March 2014. The Unite national executive took 
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immediate action following the special conference halving its affiliates to 500,000 (Watt 
2014). 
 
While the unfounded allegations against Stevie Deans and the attacks upon Unite’s strategy 
from within the Labour Party highlight the extent to which the party-union relationship had 
deteriorated under the New Labour administrations, and is further reflected in the internal 
divisions since the election of Jeremy Corbyn as party leader, the real consequence of these 
developments under the period of the Coalition government was to provide opportunities 
for the press, in particular, to further smear the trade union movement and its links to 
Labour ahead of the election. More importantly, it also provided part of the rationale for 
further legislative intervention in the relationship between union electoral campaigning and 
the Labour Party and into union internal affairs. This came first through Parts 2 and 3 of the 
Coalition’s Transparency of Lobbying, Non-party Campaigning and Trade Union 
Administration Act, 2014 (the Lobbying Act; see also chapter eleven). The Conservatives’ 
subsequent 2015 Trade Union Bill intervenes further in the internal affairs of the Labour 
Party and its relationship with the trade unions, specifically by changing the way parts of 
union members’ subscriptions are used to fund political activity by their union (Institute of 
Employment Rights 2015).  
 
Conclusions – plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose 
Following the 2015 election, the Conservative government has been explicit in its attempt to 
further weaken trade unions, namely through the proposals in the Trade Union Bill to place 
further hurdles in the way of taking industrial action, restricting facilities time and requiring 
public sector unions to effectively re-recruit their members and making it harder for them to 
use their members’ money for political activity, including funding the Labour Party. What 
this chapter has argued, however, is that many of the issues covered in the Bill had 
immediate triggers in the period of Coalition government, supported directly or indirectly by 
the Conservatives and – to a greater or, latterly, lesser degree – Liberal Democrats. These 
include the restriction of facility time in the civil service, the establishment of the Carr 
Review and the support for austerity policies aimed at cutting and fundamentally 
restructuring public services. The Coalition government’s actions against more oppositional 
trade unions, such as Unite and the PCS, that sought to challenge government policy and 
use industrial action and political campaigning to pressure employers, hardened the 
position taken by the Labour administrations of 1997-2010. This is because, under a 
dominant neo-liberal paradigm, the ‘legitimate’ role for trade unions is, at best, one based 
upon productivity coalitions, life-long learning and individual representation, not collective 
organisation, industrial struggle and political campaigning. Certainly, the official 
endorsement of attacks on facility time was a relatively novel feature of the Coalition, even 
if Conservatives had previously contemplated the possibility of this line of assault on trade 
union representative ability. As Smith (2015, 356) observes, Liberal Democrat opposition 
prevented the Coalition moving to restrict the law on industrial action, but we find no 
similar coyness in the Coalition’s approach to other aspects of union activity and 
functioning. 
In terms of lessons for the trade unions, despite the difficulties experienced under the 
coalition, the activities of Unite and PCS highlight how austerity related neo-liberalism can 
be challenged at the workplace and politically. Despite the severe problems faced by the 
PCS it has retained its organisation, responding to cuts in facilities time and the ending of 
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check-off and still seeks to challenge the contraction of public services, notably in the long 
and bitter dispute at the National Gallery (PCS 2015b) over privatisation, terms and 
conditions and the re-instatement of a sacked representative. Similarly, Unite has 
maintained membership through organising and continues with its leverage campaigns; it is 
rebuilding its organisation at Ineos, has played a major role in securing a collective 
agreement at Hinkley Point power station and was heavily involved in securing the election 
of both Jeremy Corbyn and Tom Watson to leadership positions in the Labour party. With 
the cut to state funded trade union education now in place, general cuts to adult education 
and strong pressure from the Conservative Trade Union Reform Campaign to end all state 
funding of union activity, the future for dominant partnership and Union Learn based 
approaches is also under threat. It will be interesting and important to examine how the 
outcome of general secretary elections at the GMB and Unison impact on these large 
unions’ strategy and how effective public sector unions, in particular, will be in addressing 
the challenges posed by a Trade Union Bill, which was ‘made’ under the 2010-15 Coalition 
government. 
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